Before Figma went public, Dylan Field owned less than a tenth of the company but controlled more than half of its voting power. The discrepancy came from an increasingly familiar piece of venture architecture: different classes of shares carrying radically different voting rights, combined in Figma’s case with a voting proxy from co-founder Evan Wallace. When Adobe offered $20 billion for the company in 2022, this distinction was not theoretical. Field’s economic stake was relatively modest, but his voting position gave him effective blocking power over a transaction requiring majority shareholder approval.
The interesting point is not really that founders can negotiate supervoting shares. It is that economic ownership and corporate power have become increasingly separable variables. We continue to describe venture-backed companies through cap tables: founders own 25%, investors 50%, employees 15%, and so on. Yet this tells us how value is distributed, not necessarily how decisions are made. A founder can be heavily diluted economically while remaining remarkably undiluted strategically.
That creates something like a second cap table running alongside the economic one. Instead of mapping who owns what, it maps who can cause something to happen, who can prevent it, and under which circumstances. For investors and founders alike, that second cap table may eventually matter more than the first.
Control has become another form of capital
Venture financing progressively unbundles rights that appear identical when a company is created. Shares provide economic participation, but corporate power can separately reside in voting rights, board appointment rights, protective provisions, proxies and class-specific consent rights. Supervoting is simply the most visible manifestation. 10 or 15 votes per share can allow a founder to preserve influence long after successive financing rounds have reduced their economic ownership.
But control is not one-dimensional. A founder with a majority of shareholder votes does not necessarily control the board, nor can supervoting automatically override rights granted separately to preferred investors. Conversely, an investor does not need majority ownership to wield considerable influence if its consent is required for a financing, acquisition, issuance of senior securities or change in governance. The source material makes this distinction particularly clear: supervoting changes the mathematics of shareholder votes, but does not by itself create board seats or eliminate preferred shareholder protections.
This suggests that we should stop thinking about governance simply as the consequence of ownership. It is better understood as an independent allocation of options over future strategic states. A veto may appear irrelevant for years, until an acquisition arrives. A board seat may look ceremonial until management needs to be changed. A voting proxy may remain invisible until shareholders disagree. Like many forms of optionality, governance rights derive much of their value from situations that have not yet occurred.
The best founders negotiate different contracts with capital
Why would investors accept this separation between economics and power? Because venture financing is ultimately a negotiation, and negotiating leverage changes dramatically across companies and over time. When a startup desperately needs one investor, capital dictates terms. When several investors desperately want access to the same startup, the company can negotiate not only price, but architecture.
This is why founder-control structures tend to become more relevant later rather than earlier. At formation, founders own nearly everything anyway; additional voting rights provide little incremental benefit. After several rounds, however, dilution begins to threaten control precisely when the strongest companies may possess their greatest bargaining power. Uber introduced differentiated voting rights around its Series C; Facebook established its dual-class structure while still private; other companies have locked them in closer to an IPO.
There is an interesting paradox here. Success can increase a founder’s governance leverage per unit of equity. Their economic ownership declines as capital enters the company, but if the business becomes sufficiently attractive, their ability to dictate the terms on which that capital enters may increase. The strongest founders can therefore sell more of the economics without surrendering a proportional amount of power. Capital dilutes; control does not necessarily have to.
The real question is which control matters
There is an obvious temptation to conclude that founders should maximise control whenever they can. That would be too simplistic. Governance rights consume negotiating capital like anything else, and excessive concentration of power creates costs. Investors asked to provide substantial capital without meaningful influence must effectively extend the duration of their bet on one individual’s judgment. What protects a visionary founder against short-term shareholder pressure can also protect an underperforming founder against legitimate intervention. The architecture cannot know in advance which situation it will eventually face.
Control is also less permanent than it appears. High-vote shares commonly convert when transferred; proxies can be narrowly defined; sunset clauses can terminate enhanced voting rights after an IPO or founder departure; and subsequent financing rounds can reopen arrangements that once looked entrenched. Uber is instructive here: the company’s supervoting structure eventually disappeared as part of the governance renegotiation surrounding SoftBank’s investment. The broader lesson is that no financing round is entirely independent of the next one. Rights negotiated today determine the starting position of tomorrow’s negotiation, while tomorrow’s need for capital determines how durable those rights really are.
At Entropia Capital, we think about governance in terms of the decisions a company may have to make before the evidence is in. A biotech founder may need another year to reach a clinical readout. An industrial company may have to order equipment before its first customer is ready to commit. In both cases, we may want the founder to have room to make that call. We also want to know who can change course if the assumptions behind it break.
The test we’d apply before signing a round is simple. Take the milestone that justifies the investment and move it back by twelve months. Who can commit more capital? Whose consent is needed to raise it? Who can change the plan if the money doesn’t come? At signing, everyone can agree on the destination. The second cap table tells you who gets to decide how far the company can afford to go.



I wonder how often founders get a better outcome by asking for authority over two or three specific decisions instead of negotiating for outright control. If the real fear is being forced into an early sale, why spend bargaining power on every other shareholder vote?
There’s a third thing I’d put next to the two cap tables: who can afford to wait. A founder with ten years of their career in the company and a fund approaching the end of its life can look at the same offer and reach very different conclusions. Both can be acting rationally.