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Alana Brantley's avatar

I wonder how often founders get a better outcome by asking for authority over two or three specific decisions instead of negotiating for outright control. If the real fear is being forced into an early sale, why spend bargaining power on every other shareholder vote?

Victor Katz's avatar

There’s a third thing I’d put next to the two cap tables: who can afford to wait. A founder with ten years of their career in the company and a fund approaching the end of its life can look at the same offer and reach very different conclusions. Both can be acting rationally.

Joyce Shah's avatar

The delayed milestone is a good test. In biotech, I’d want the board to distinguish between a trial that takes another year because enrolment is slow and one that takes another year because the early data changed the hypothesis. Same impact on runway. Very different reasons to back the founder’s plan.

Jenny Parker's avatar

The sale example gets even more interesting once you bring liquidation preferences into it. Two investors can read the same offer and see very different outcomes for their own shares. I’d want the payout waterfall beside the approval thresholds before guessing who will vote yes.

Jonathan Bloom's avatar

Your twelve-month delay test is the right one. I'd add a second column to the second cap table: when each right switches on. Most consents sit dormant until a trigger, a down round or a missed milestone, and founders tend to read them at signing as if the company will always be on plan. Which provisions do you find founders least expect to matter at the slipped-milestone moment?

Pierrick Bouffaron's avatar

Good point, Jonathan. The one I’d put first is the debt consent. Everyone negotiates the valuation. The borrowing limit gets a quick read because nobody plans to borrow. Then the readout slips, the next tranche is held back, and the only money on the table is a convertible bridge. If that note needs preferred-holder consent, the people who can block it may have no obligation to fund it.

The other is who gets to certify the milestone. The team thinks it’s 3 months late. The investor thinks the acceptance criteria still haven’t been met. By then, who decides whether the milestone is satisfied, and who can extend the deadline, can matter more than the size of the tranche (especially in frontier tech)

Jonathan Bloom's avatar

Both are the same problem in different forms: the power to stop something, held by someone with no duty to make it work. A holder can block the bridge without having to fund it, and an investor can decline to certify the milestone without having to extend the deadline. That asymmetry is easy to miss at signing, when everyone expects to be on plan. Thanks, these are excellent examples